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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHEN, WHERE AND WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS
THE RIGHT TO RECORD POLICE COMMUNICATIONS: A
SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE GUIDELINE FOR DETERMINING
THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO RECORD AND FOR REVAMPING
RESTRICTIVE STATE WIRETAPPING LAWS

INTRODUCTION
To some, if not most, “[w]iretapping sounds like it should involve a man in
a headset sitting in a van listening in on your telephone calls.”1 However, the
legal definition of wiretapping in some states encompasses much more than
this, and even conduct the average individual does not realize is a crime.2 In
some states, it does not take a man sitting in a van with a headset to commit
wiretapping. Rather, all it takes is a Blackberry or an iPhone capable of
recording audio. The penalty for audio recording the oral communications of a
police officer in Illinois in the absence of the officer’s permission: a Class 1
felony3 carrying up to fifteen years in prison.4 Recording others is a Class 4
felony5 carrying a maximum sentence of three years in prison.6 The penalty in
Massachusetts for recording the oral communications of an officer in the
absence of the officer’s permission: up to five years in state prison.7 In Illinois,
it is a crime to record the oral communications of two or more persons
regardless of whether the parties intended their conversation to be private
unless the recording party has the permission of all the parties to the
conversation.8 In Massachusetts, it is illegal to secretly record any oral
communication without the consent of all the parties to the conversation.9
To illustrate the problem the Illinois wiretapping law creates, take
Tiawanda Moore, age 21, who, with the help of her Blackberry, was charged
1. Rob Arcamona, Jeff Hermes, & Andy Sellars, Wiretapping, SOPA, Occupy: 2011 Was a
Tumultuous Year in Media Law, PBS (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2011/12/
wiretapping-sopa-occupy-2011-was-a-tumultuous-year-in-media-law357.html (internal quotation
marks omitted).
2. Id.
3. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2010). Audio recording the oral communications of
public officials and judges without consent is also a Class 1 felony. Id.
4. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30(a).
5. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(a).
6. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-45(a).
7. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2010).
8. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1).
9. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 99(B)(4), (C)(1).
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with the offense of eavesdropping after she secretly recorded a conversation
she had with Internal Affairs police officers who tried to discourage her from
filing a formal complaint against a police officer who had groped her.10 The
incident started when an officer responded to a domestic violence call at the
apartment Moore and her then-boyfriend shared.11 As Moore was being
interviewed in her bedroom, the police officer allegedly grabbed her breasts
and buttocks before suggesting they should “hook up.”12 Moore went to police
headquarters to report the incident and when interviewed was met with officers
discouraging her from filing a complaint.13 When the officers left her alone in
the interview room, she turned on the recorder function on her cell phone.14
When the officers became aware that the recorder was running, they arrested
Moore for eavesdropping.15 She spent two weeks in the Cook County Jail.16
Because Moore recorded the oral communications of the officers without their
consent, she faced up to fifteen years in prison.17 Moore, like most, was not
aware the law existed.18 She fought the charges for a year and was acquitted by
a jury last summer.19
As evidenced by Ms. Moore’s ordeal, wiretapping in Illinois can have
grave consequences.20 The consequences are similar in Massachusetts.21
However, the recording of police communications is a protected First
Amendment newsgathering right subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.22 Therefore, complete and absolute bans on audio recording are in
conflict with the First Amendment. Furthermore, the laws are outdated. The
Illinois and Massachusetts wiretapping laws were written ages ago, before any
American carried a mobile device capable of recording audio.23 Today, not
only are these devices readily available, but social media sites such as
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube allow recorders viable media outlets to

10. Andy Grimm, Woman acquitted in eavesdropping case files lawsuit against Chicago
Police, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-01-14/news/chi-wo
man-tiawanda-moore-acquitted-in-eavesdropping-case-against-chicago-police-department-fileslawsuit-20120114_1_eavesdropping-moore-claims-lawsuit.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Grimm, supra note 10.
16. Id.
17. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b) (2010).
18. Grimm, supra note 10.
19. Id.
20. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-4(b).
21. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2010).
22. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011).
23. See 1961 Ill. Law 1983; 1959 Mass. Acts 400.
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express themselves and publish such videos as well.24 Today, unlike forty
years ago, technology allows every person to be a potential reporter or
journalist,25 or even a potential moviemaker.26
The purpose of this Note is three-fold. First, it addresses the federal
wiretapping law and various states’ wiretapping laws, including Massachusetts
and Illinois. Illinois and Massachusetts will be specifically addressed because
they are among the most restrictive in the nation.27 Second, this Note will
address those courts that have held that the recording of police
communications is a protected First Amendment newsgathering right.
Recently, the First Circuit, in Glik v. Cunniffe, held that the audio recording of
police communications enjoys broad First Amendment protection.28 The Third
Circuit, in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, held similarly, but unlike the Glik
court, described the First Amendment right narrowly.29 It should be noted at
the outset that this note addresses only those laws that prohibit the interception
of a police officer’s oral communications and how those laws conform with the
protections of the First Amendment. The act of merely video recording the
police without intercepting audio will not be addressed.30 Lastly, based in large
part on Glik and Kelly, this Note proposes a practical guideline both for
determining the scope and confines of the First Amendment right to record
police communications and for revamping constitutionally defective state
wiretapping laws. The guideline provides that the First Amendment protects an
individual’s right to audio record a uniformed, on duty police officer’s oral
communications unless the recording would “substantially interfere” with the
performance of the officer’s duties.
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF WIRETAPPING LAW
A.

Federal Law

The Federal Wiretap Act was enacted by Congress as part of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”).31 It prohibits any

24. See Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights
Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 616–17 (2009).
25. Id. at 617.
26. Adam Cohen, Should Videotaping the Police Really Be a Crime?, TIME (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2008566,00.html.
27. See infra Part I.B.
28. 655 F.3d at 82, 85.
29. 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d. Cir. 2010).
30. Videotaping of public officials has been held though to be an exercise of First
Amendment liberties. Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999).
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006); Shana K. Rahavy, The Federal Wiretap Act: The
Permissible Scope of Eavesdropping in the Family Home, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 87, 88 (2003).
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person from intentionally intercepting any oral communication.32 The penalty:
up to five years in prison.33 “Intercept,” as defined within the statute, means
“the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any . . . oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”34 “Oral
communication” is defined as any communication “uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation . . . .”35 This
definition of “oral communication” came in response to the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Katz v. United States36 and was a conscious effort by
Congress to strike a balance between the privacy rights of individuals and the
legitimate investigatory needs of law enforcement.37
In Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic recording device to a public
telephone booth in order to record Katz’s conversations.38 Based on those
conversations, Katz was arrested for illegal betting.39 The Supreme Court
overturned the conviction, holding that Katz was entitled to privacy in his oral
communications even though the conversation he was arrested for occurred in
a public phone booth.40 Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, established
the test for determining when constitutional protection attaches to personal
conversations.41 For constitutional protection to attach to a personal
conversation, the speaker must have exhibited an actual expectation that the
conversation was intended to be private, and the expectation must be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.42 The “reasonable expectation
of privacy” test established by Justice Harlan has been routinely applied by the
Supreme Court when determining the confines of the Fourth Amendment.43
Like Katz, the Federal Wiretap Act prohibits the interception of an oral
communication only when the parties to the conversation have a reasonable
expectation that their communications will be private.44 Furthermore, an

32. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006).
33. Id. § 2511(4)(a).
34. Id. § 2510(4).
35. Id. § 2510(2).
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), superceded by statute, Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act
of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20, as recognized in United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450
(9th Cir. 1991).
37. Rahavy, supra note 31, at 88.
38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 352.
41. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. Id.
43. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (referencing several cases
applying Justice Harlan’s test to Fourth Amendment challenges between 1967 and 2000, and
again applying the test to a Fourth Amendment issue in 2011).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2006).
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interception of an oral communication is not prohibited if the recorder of the
communication is a party to the communication or if one of the parties to the
communication offers prior consent.45 After enactment of Title III, forty-nine
states passed or amended their wiretapping laws.46 The states were free to
enact more restrictive wiretapping laws.47 Most did not.48 Forty states,49 like
the federal government, subscribe to the one-party consent approach, where if
one party consents to the recording, no interception occurs.50
B.

Restrictive State Wiretapping Laws

There are at least two state wiretapping laws that are substantially more
restrictive than their federal counterpart and the laws of nearly every other
state. The analysis focuses on the Massachusetts and Illinois wiretapping laws
because they are the most restrictive. However, other states, such as California,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, have also enacted strict wiretapping laws.51
1.

Massachusetts

Under the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Act, anyone who secretly
intercepts any oral communication without the consent of all parties is guilty of
unlawful interception.52 Unlike the federal wiretapping law, where only one
party must consent to the recording,53 the Massachusetts law requires every

45. Id. § 2511(2)(d).
46. Marianne F. Kies, Note, Policing the Police: Freedom of the Press, the Right to Privacy,
and Civilian Recordings of Police Activity, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 274, 280 (2011).
47. Id. at 280–81.
48. See id. at 281 n.43 (only eleven states were listed as having enacted more restrictive laws
than the federal government as of November 2011).
49. See Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards
in State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 487, 495 (2011) (noting that ten states require all-party consent).
50. Id. at 493, 495.
51. See id. at 496–500 (explaining that California’s wiretapping law “flatly criminalizes the
recordation of telephonic, electronic, and other wire communications, without the consent of all
parties, whether the recorded party displays a reasonable expectation of privacy or not”; that
Pennsylvania’s laws track the federal statute word for word with the exception of adding a
provision requiring all party consent; and that Washington’s laws impose criminal penalties on
anyone that intercepts “private conversations” without obtaining consent from all parties).
52. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2010). The statute states in relevant part:
[A]ny person who willfully commits an interception, attempts to commit an interception,
or procures any other person to commit an interception or to attempt to commit an
interception of any wire or oral communication shall be fined not more than ten thousand
dollars, or imprisoned in the state prison for not more than five years . . . .
Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1090

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1085

party to consent.54 The term intercept “means to secretly hear, secretly record,
or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any wire or
oral communication through the use of any intercepting device by any person
other than a person given prior authority by all parties to such
communication . . . .”55 As seen, the statute draws a distinction based on
whether the recording was made secretly or in plain view,56 not on whether the
speaker intended for the conversation to be private. If the recording was made
in plain view, the interception is not illegal.57 However, if the recording is
made secretly or covertly and the recorder does not have the consent of the
parties, the interception is illegal.58
To illustrate the problem posed by a wiretapping statute that does not hinge
on whether the speakers intended their conversation to be private, take
Commonwealth v. Hyde, a heavily criticized 2001 decision by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts.59 In that case, the court upheld the conviction
of a motorist for wiretapping after he secretly recorded statements made by
police officers during a traffic stop.60 Mr. Hyde was stopped by police officers
because his car had a broken taillight and a loud exhaust system.61 The
situation escalated and Hyde accused the officers of stopping him because he
had “long hair.”62 Unknown to the officers, Hyde had activated a hand-held
tape recorder and recorded the entire encounter.63 A week after the encounter,
he filed an internal complaint with the police department and offered the tape
he made of the altercation as proof of harassment.64 Thereafter, the police
department filed criminal charges against Hyde for the illegal interception of
an oral communication without the consent of all parties.65 Hyde argued that
like its federal counterpart, the Massachusetts statute was not applicable under
the circumstances because the police officers were performing their public
duties, and therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
conversations.66 Without addressing whether police officers have an
54. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(4), (C)(1). However, the law did not always require
all party consent. Prior to 1968, the law permitted the recording of one’s own conversations, or
conversations with the prior permission of one party. Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963,
967 (Mass. 2001).
55. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(4).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 99(C)(1).
59. 750 N.E.2d 963 (2011).
60. Id. at 967.
61. Id. at 964.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 965.
64. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 967.
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expectation of privacy in their conversations with members of the public, the
court held that Title III was inapplicable because the Massachusetts legislature
intended to “create a more restrictive surveillance statute than comparable
statutes in other States.”67 Unlike its federal counterpart and the wiretapping
laws of many other states, there is no expectation of privacy language in the
statute.68 In upholding Hyde’s conviction, the court stated that the statute
“prohibit[s] all secret recordings by members of the public, including
recordings of police officers or other public officials interacting with members
of the public, when made without their permission or knowledge.”69
The Hyde decision has been routinely criticized.70 It stands for the
proposition that one can be criminally prosecuted for the use of an ordinary
tape recorder to capture the voice of any unknowing person, regardless of the
setting in which the recording is made or regardless of whether the individual
being recorded has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
communications.71 The preamble to the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Act
provides support that this is the wrong interpretation of the statute.72 The
preamble states that the statute was enacted for two main purposes: first, to
deter the efforts of organized crime by permitting law enforcement officials the
use of modern methods of electronic surveillance, under strict judicial
supervision, when investigating organized criminal activities, and second, to
outlaw the secret use of modern electronic surveillance devices among
citizens.73 Neither reason suggests a basis for restricting an individual’s right to
use a tape recorder or cell phone to capture the communications that individual
is having with law enforcement officers.
Not only has Hyde been criticized, but the validity of the statute under
which Hyde was convicted has been called into doubt. In Jean v.
Massachusetts State Police, Jean, a local political activist, maintained a
website displaying articles and other information critical of a District
Attorney.74 In October of 2005, a man contacted Jean through her website and
explained that eight armed State Police troopers arrested him in his home on a

67. Id.
68. Id. at 968 n.6.
69. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 967.
70. See, e.g., id. at 974 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that there is no way the
legislature intended to outlaw “the secret tape recording of a public exchange between a police
officer and a citizen.”); Lisa A. Skehill, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the
Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow for the Surreptitious Recording of Police
Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1011 (2009).
71. Roger Michel, Criminal Law: Electronic Surveillance—General Laws Chapter 272,
Section 99, 86 MASS. L. REV. 62, 62 (2001).
72. Id. at 63.
73. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(A) (2010).
74. Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
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misdemeanor charge.75 He met the officers at the front door, where he allowed
them to handcuff him.76 The officers then conducted a warrantless search of his
house, which was subsequently audiotaped and videotaped by a “nannycam.”77 The man provided Jean a copy of the recording.78 After she posted the
video, Jean was contacted by the Massachusetts State Police, who claimed she
had violated the state wiretapping statute by willfully disclosing the recording
made without their consent.79 Instead of removing the video, Jean filed a
complaint in federal district court seeking a temporary restraining order and
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the Massachusetts State
Police.80 Citing her First Amendment right to free speech, Jean sought
preclusion from threats of prosecution by the officers or enforcement of the
wiretapping statute against her.81 The district court granted a temporary
restraining order preventing the police from interfering with Jean’s “disclosure,
use, or display, including posting on the internet,” of the audio and video
recording.82
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided the issue as to
whether the First Amendment prevented the police officers from interfering
with Jean’s internet posting of the audio and visual recording.83 After finding
the government interest in preserving privacy and deterring illegal
interceptions to be insufficiently compelling, the court affirmed the district
court’s order, stating that “Jean’s publication of the recording on her website
is . . . entitled to . . . First Amendment protection.”84

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Jean, 492 F.3d at 25–26. It should be noted that Jean was charged with willfully
disclosing an interception. The statute states that an individual who “willfully discloses or
attempts to disclose to any person the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing that
the information was obtained through interception . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(3)(a) (2010). Since she was not the one who “intercepted” the oral
communication, she could not be charged with “interception” under section 99(C)(1), a felony.
However, the court did conclude that the original recording of the search was an illegal
“interception” under section 99(C)(1). Jean, 492 F.3d at 31.
80. Jean, 492 F.3d at 26.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 25.
84. Id. at 33.
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Illinois

Like the Massachusetts wiretapping law, the Illinois Eavesdropping Act
prohibits secret audio recordings.85 However, it also prohibits open recordings
regardless of whether the parties intended their conversation to be private.86
The Act states that “[a] person commits eavesdropping when he . . .
[k]nowingly and intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the purpose of
hearing or recording all or any part of any conversation . . . unless he does so
with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation.”87 A “conversation”
is defined broadly to include “any oral communication between 2 or more
persons regardless of whether one or more of the parties intended their
communication to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that
exception.”88 Therefore, in Illinois, any audio recording, whether open or
secret, and regardless of whether the parties intended the conversation to be
private, is prohibited unless all the parties to the conversation consent to the
recording.89 As seen, the Illinois statue expressly declines to follow the oneparty consent approach taken by its federal counterpart.90
The definition of “conversation” was added by the Illinois legislature in
1994.91 By adding the definition, the Illinois legislature “extended the coverage
of the eavesdropping statute to all conversations, regardless of whether they
were intended to be private.”92 Two cases that preceded the additional
definition shed light on why the Illinois legislature added the definition of
“conversation” to the statue in 1994 and how the eavesdropping statute was
interpreted by courts prior to the addition.93
In People v. Klingenberg, the defendant was arrested and charged with
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.94 While in police
custody, the defendant performed specified physical acts intended to determine
the extent to which he was intoxicated.95 An audiovisual recording was made
of the defendant’s responses and his performance of the coordination tasks.96

85. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1) (2010). Eavesdropping and wiretapping will be used
interchangeably throughout this Note and, for the purposes of this Note, consist of the same
conduct.
86. Id. 5/14-1(d).
87. Id. 5/14-2(a)(1).
88. Id. 5/14-1(d) (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2006).
91. People v. Nestrock, 735 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
92. Id. (quoting People v. Siwek, 671 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
93. Id.
94. 339 N.E.2d 456, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
95. See id.
96. Id.
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Upon the defendant’s motion, the circuit court suppressed the audio portion of
the recording on the theory that it was made in violation of the eavesdropping
statute.97 The appellate court reversed and held that the recording of the
defendant’s voice during the in-custodial interrogation was not
“eavesdropping” within the meaning of the statute.98 In determining whether
the recording of the defendant’s responses constituted eavesdropping, the
appellate court examined whether the legislature intended to protect this type
of communication from interception.99 The court found in the negative,
holding that “the framers of the statute intended the term ‘eavesdropping’ to
refer to the listening to or recording of those oral statements intended by the
declarant to be of a private nature.”100 Therefore, the court concluded that “the
statute was enacted to protect the individual from the interception of
communication intended to be private.”101 Because the defendant was talking
directly to deputies, the court ruled the defendant did not intend his
conversation to be private and thus had no expectation of privacy in his
communications.102
In People v. Beardsley, Mr. Beardsley was pulled over for speeding.103
After refusing to surrender his driver’s license to officers, he was placed in the
back of a squad car.104 While sitting there, he openly recorded a conversation
between the arresting officer and his partner sitting in the front seat.105 The
officers were not aware they were being recorded.106 The Supreme Court of
Illinois held that the primary factor in determining whether Beardsley
committed the offense of eavesdropping was not whether all the parties
consented to the recording.107 Rather, the primary factor was “whether the
officers/declarants intended their conversation to be of a private nature under
circumstances justifying such expectation.”108 The court first noted that if the
officers had intended their conversation to be private, they would have left the
squad car instead of carrying on the conversation with Beardsley in the back
seat.109 Ultimately, the court held that “[b]ecause there was no surreptitious
interception of a communication intended by the declarants to be private,

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Klingenberg, 339 N.E.2d at 459.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id.
People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 347 (Ill. 1986).
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id.
Id. at 350.
Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d at 350.
Id.
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secret, or confidential, under circumstances justifying such expectation, there
was no violation of the eavesdropping statute.”110
Today, it is clear that Klingenberg and Beardsley are superseded by statute
and, if they were heard today, would be decided differently.111 The 1994
addition of the term “conversation” makes it clear that the monitoring of
conversations is illegal in Illinois regardless of whether the parties intended
their conversation to be of a private nature.112 Based on the legislative history
of the amendment, the primary purpose of the addition was to reverse the
Beardsley decision.113
Also interesting is that the police do not have to play by the same rules in
Illinois. Uniformed police may, at their discretion and without a warrant,
record their conversations with civilians during “enforcement stops.”114
“Enforcement stops” include, but are not limited to, traffic stops, pedestrian
stops, abandoned vehicle contacts, motorist assists, commercial motor vehicle
stops, roadside safety checks, requests for identification, and responses to
requests for emergency assistance.115 Police departments across the country
now require their officers to record such encounters because there is a growing
consensus regarding the need to record major evidentiary events in the criminal
process.116 However, while uniformed police can record virtually all of their
conversations with the public,117 members of the public are precluded from
recording those same conversations.118
Due to advancements in technology, three things have happened in Illinois.
First, because of the prevalence of cell phones equipped with the ability to
record audio,119 arrests for violations of Illinois’ Eavesdropping Act have
become more common.120 Second, due to the convenience of the internet,121
the public is readily aware of such arrests. Third, due to the popularity of social

110. Id.
111. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1 (2010).
112. People v. Nestrock, 735 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
113. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012)
(No. 11–1286).
114. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-3(h).
115. Id.
116. Alderman, supra note 49, at 530–31.
117. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 113, at 6.
118. Id.
119. See Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 341 (2011) (noting that in modern
America, cell phone ownership is nearly universal and virtually every cell phone has digital
image capacity).
120. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 113, at 7–8; c.f. Radley Balko, The War on
Cameras, REASON MAG., Jan. 2011 at 24, 25.(discussing individuals being prosecuted in various
states for violations of wiretapping statutes).
121. Cohen, supra note 26, at 22.
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media sites such as YouTube and Twitter,122 the public has opportunity to
voice their concerns with the perceived injustice the law is accomplishing. In
regards to arrests, take, for example, Michael H. Allison, a forty-one-year-old
backyard mechanic from southeastern Illinois123 who was charged with the
offense of eavesdropping in 2009.124 Prior to being charged with
eavesdropping, Allison received a city ordinance violation over an alleged
abandoned vehicle on his premises.125 After receiving the violation, Allison
recorded conversations he had with police, the city attorney, the circuit clerk’s
office, and the court concerning the ordinance violation.126 If convicted,
Allison would have faced up to seventy-five years in prison; all for an act most
people do not realize is a crime.127 Or, consider Chris Drew, a sixty-one-yearold artist charged with eavesdropping when he, in the midst of being arrested
for selling art on a downtown street without a permit, made an audio recording
of his encounter with the police.128
Like the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Act, the validity of the Illinois
Eavesdropping Act has been called into doubt by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.129 Troubled by documented cases of police misconduct
such as Tiawanda Moore’s,130 the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”),
a civil rights and liberties activist group, has devised a specific program for
monitoring police conduct in Illinois (the “ACLU Program”).131 The ACLU
Program would openly audio record police officers “without their consent
when (1) the officers are performing their public duties; (2) the officers are in
public places; (3) the officers are speaking at a volume audible to the
unassisted human ear; and (4) the manner of the recording is otherwise
lawful.”132 The stated purpose of the program is to improve police practices
and to detect and deter police misconduct.133 The ACLU says the audio

122. Kreimer, supra note 119, at 341 (noting that social networking sites like Facebook, along
with sites like Flickr, YouTube, and TwitPic, have combined with increasingly usable blogging
technology to enable any holder of an image to make it instantly available to the world at large).
123. Balko, supra note 120.
124. People v. Allison, No. 2009–CF–50 at 2 (Sept. 15, 2011) (order dismissing motion to
declare 720 ILCS 5/14 unconstitutional), available at http://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/docs/
20120322_125429_allison_trial_court_decision.pdf.
125. Id. at 1.
126. Id. at 1–2.
127. Balko, supra note 120, at 22.
128. Ryan Haggerty & Jason Meisner, Illinois’ eavesdropping law under attack, CHICAGO
TRIB., Jan. 2, 2012, at C1.
129. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
130. See Grimm, supra note 10.
131. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 588.
132. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 113, at 9.
133. Complaint at 4, ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 2010 WL 4386868 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2010)
(No. 10 Civ. 5235).
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recordings would be open, would occur during expressive events on public
forums, and “would not occur when officers are off duty or in private places,
and would not interfere with or endanger police or involve trespass.”134 When
appropriate, the ACLU would publish the recordings to the general public and
use the recordings to petition the government for redress of grievances.135
So far, the ACLU has not implemented the program for fear of prosecution
under the Illinois Eavesdropping Act.136 In August of 2010, the ACLU sued
Anita Alvarez, in her official capacity as Cook County State’s Attorney,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.137 Unfortunately, the case was
dismissed for a lack of standing before the merits of the case could be
reached.138 However, the ACLU has appealed the ruling and is asking the
Seventh Circuit for a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the
eavesdropping statute as applied to its specified audio recording program.139
Recently, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the ACLU of Illinois and entered a
preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of the Illinois
eavesdropping statute against the ACLU’s employees or agents who openly
record the oral communications of police officers when the officers are
performing in their official duties in public places.140
II. THE PROTECTIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The debate over the constitutionality of state wiretapping laws like Illinois’
and Massachusetts’ focuses on the First Amendment. The First Amendment
states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press.”141 It applies to the states and their political subdivisions
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.142 At first look,
the protections of the First Amendment seem limited.143 “Speech” means “[t]he

134. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 113, at 9.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 10.
137. Complaint, supra note 133, at 1.
138. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, No. 10-cv-05235, 2010 WL 4386868 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28,
2010), rev’d, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
139. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012).
140. Id. In granting the injunction, the court reviewed the Illinois eavesdropping law under
intermediate scrutiny. While struggling to determine which variation of intermediate scrutiny to
apply, the court stated that regardless of which variation to apply, the law was “not closely
tailored to the government’s interest in protecting conversational privacy.” Id. at 607. The court
went on to state “[i]f protecting privacy is the justification for the law, then the law must be more
closely tailored to serve that interest in order to avoid trampling on speech and press rights.” Id. at
608.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
142. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000).
143. See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:
Towards A Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249,
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expression or communication of thoughts or opinions in spoken words;
something spoken or uttered.”144 “Press” has been described as “[t]he news
media; print and broadcast news organizations collectively.”145 By those
definitions, an individual’s recording of police activity fits in neither category.
While the spoken words would constitute speech, the recording of those words
by an individual (one not a member of a print or broadcast news organization)
would not be. Furthermore, a recording would not be considered “press” unless
a member of a print or broadcast news organization captured it. However, the
Supreme Court has rejected a literal reading of the First Amendment, and it has
established that the First Amendment guarantees freedom of expression146 and
protects a range of conduct related to the gathering and dissemination of
information.147 The next two sections illustrate the range of conduct the First
Amendment protects, including the right to gather information—and the right
to record information.
A.

The First Amendment Right to Gather Information and News

As the Supreme Court stated, “the First Amendment . . . prohibit[s]
government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the
public may draw.”148 Originally, the right to gather information and news
applied exclusively to the news media. Today, however, the public’s right of
access to information is coexistent with that of the press,149 and the right to
gather news and information applies equally to news media and the public at
large.150 Changes in technology have made the lines between private citizens
and journalists exceedingly difficult to draw.151 Due to the proliferation of

250 (2004) (“[i]n their most literal form, the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment
protect the freedom to speak and the freedom to publish using a printing press.”).
144. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1529 (9th ed. 2009).
145. Id. at 1304; see David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 436
(2002) (“The most famous discussion of the meaning of the Press Clause, a 1974 speech by
Justice Stewart, identified its beneficiaries as ‘the daily newspapers and other established news
media,’ or ‘newspapers, television networks, and magazines.’”).
146. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (phrasing
issue as “constitutional right to freedom of speech or expression”).
147. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011).
148. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is . . . well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas.”).
149. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that the
Constitution “assure[s] the public and the press equal access once government has opened its
doors”).
150. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment does not
guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the
public generally.”).
151. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.
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electronic devices with video-recording capability, news stories are just as
likely to be uncovered by a blogger at his or her computer as by a reporter at a
major newspaper.152 Therefore, the newsgathering protections of the First
Amendment cannot turn on professional credentials.153 Instead, the
newsgathering protections of the First Amendment turn on who the subject of
the recording is and whether the matter is one of public interest.154
The right to gather information and news is especially important in the
context of information regarding government officials.155 “Gathering
information about government officials in a form that can readily be
disseminated to others serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting
and promoting the free discussion of governmental affairs.”156 The Supreme
Court has emphasized “the paramount public interest in a free flow of
information to the people concerning public officials.”157 This is because
public officials are deemed to be servants of the people.158 Many benefits are
derived from ensuring the public’s right to gather information, such as aiding
in uncovering abuse by government officials159 and creating a mechanism by
which government operates more effectively.160 Furthermore, speech on
matters of public concern is given heightened protection under the First
Amendment.161 The Supreme Court has held that speech on matters of public
concern is “fundamental”162 to the “heart”163 of the First Amendment, and a
“core” value of the First Amendment.164

152. Id.
153. Id.; see also United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609, (1978)) (finding that the press has generally
no right to information superior to that of the general public); Lambert v. Polk County, 723 F.
Supp. 128, 133 (S.D. Iowa 1989) (“it is not just news organizations . . . who have First
Amendment rights to make and display videotapes of events . . . .”).
154. Buller v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 684 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
155. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964), overruled on other grounds by Curtis
Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1975).
156. Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (internal quotations omitted).
157. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77.
158. Id.
159. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1034–35 (1991).
160. See Press–Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
161. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“speech on public issues occupies the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values”); see also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (noting that matters of public concern are at the heart of First
Amendment protections).
162. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
163. Id.
164. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
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The First Amendment Right to Record Information

While it is clear that the gathering of information enjoys First Amendment
protection, courts are mixed as to whether the recording of the same
information receives First Amendment protection. Most courts have said
yes.165 However, some have said no.166 The majority of courts have held that
videotaping is a protected First Amendment activity when used to “gather
information about what public officials do on public property”167 and when the
recording has a communicative or expressive purpose.168 One court has gone
so far as to hold that videotaping is a protected First Amendment right
regardless of the reason for the videotaping.169 The next section considers
those cases that have addressed the right to record police officers and other
public officials while in their official capacities.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO AUDIO RECORD POLICE
COMMUNICATIONS
A.

The Older Cases

Staring in the mid-1990s, courts began to recognize a First Amendment
right to record, videotape, and photograph police activity and conduct.170 The
first court to do so was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Fordyce v. City of Seattle.171 In Fordyce, the court held that an individual who
165. See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that
“[a]udio recording is entitled to First Amendment protection.”); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212
F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995);
Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999); Demarest v. Athol/Orange Cmty.
Television, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94–95 (D. Mass. 2002); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337
F. Supp. 634, 638 (D. Minn. 1972); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa.
2005).
166. See, e.g., Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1111 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is
nothing in the Constitution which guarantees the right to record a public event.”); see Whiteland
Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that permitted
access to Planning Commission meetings did not create a federal constitutional right to videotape
the meetings).
167. Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (stating that “[t]he First Amendment protects the right to gather
information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record
matters of public interest”) (emphasis added); Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439 (recognizing a “First
Amendment right to film matters of public interest”); Iacobucci, 193 F.3d at 25; Robinson, 378 F.
Supp. 2d at 541 (“Videotaping is a legitimate means of gathering information for public
dissemination . . . .”).
168. Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005); Larsen v. Fort Wayne Police
Dept., 825 F. Supp. 2d 965, 979 (N.D. Ind. 2010).
169. Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (stating that an individual need not assert any
particular reason for videotaping).
170. Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439.
171. Id. at 436.
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filmed a public demonstration on a public street had a “First Amendment right
to film matters of public interest.”172 In that case, Mr. Fordyce was videotaping
and audio recording people on the streets of Seattle during a public protest.173
Among his subjects were police officers patrolling the protest.174 An officer
eventually approached him and asked whether his video camera was recording
audio.175 The officer then warned Fordyce that a Washington state privacy
statute forbade recording private conversations without the consent of all
participants.176 When he refused to stop recording, he was arrested for
violating the statute.177 After the charges against Fordyce were dismissed, he
brought a civil rights action against the officers for interference with his First
Amendment right to gather news.178 On appeal, the court held that Fordyce had
a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest.”179
In Robinson v. Fetterman, a district court held that the arrest of an
individual for filming police activity from private property violated the First
Amendment.180 In that case, Robinson videotaped police conducting truck
inspections on a local road because he was concerned about the way the police
were performing the inspections.181 He videotaped from an adjacent property
approximately twenty to thirty feet from the road and never interfered with
police activities.182 When approached by police, Robinson refused to stop
filming and was subsequently arrested for violation of the Pennsylvania’s
harassment statute.183 After noting that Robinson had First Amendment rights
to receive information and ideas, and to express his concern about the safety of
the truck inspections, the court held that “there can be no doubt that the free
172. Id. at 439.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 438.
175. Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439.
176. Id. The Washington wiretapping statute provides, in relevant part, that “it shall be
unlawful for any individual . . . to intercept, or record any [p]rivate conversation . . . without first
obtaining the consent of all the persons engaged in the conversation.” WASH. REV. CODE §
9.73.030 (2006).
177. Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439.
178. Id. at 438.
179. Id. at 439.
180. 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
181. Id. at 539.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 539. The Pennsylvania harassment statute provides, in relevant part “A person
commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person:
. . . follows the other person in or about a public place or places; [or] engages in a course of
conduct or repeatedly commits acts which serve no legitimate purpose.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
2709(a)(2)–(3) (2010). The district court’s opinion is unclear as to whether Robinson’s video
recording also included audio recording. If it had, the officers may have charged Robinson with
being in violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. Id.
§§ 5701–82.
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speech clause of the Constitution protected Robinson as he videotaped the
defendants.”184
In Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood, a district court held that
photographing a police officer in connection with a citizen’s political activism
was protected by the First Amendment.185 In that case, Pomykacz, a selfdescribed “citizen-activist,” became concerned over an alleged romantic
relationship between the mayor of the city and a police officer.186 In the
process of monitoring the parties, Pomykacz began photographing the officer
while she was on duty.187 The officer and the mayor initiated criminal charges
against Pomykacz for harassment.188 In her subsequent civil action, Pomykacz
alleged that her arrest violated her First Amendment rights.189 The court
declined to adopt Pomykacz’s blanket assertion that “the observation and
monitoring of public officials is protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment.”190
However, the court did imply that photography with an expressive or
communicative purpose is protected by the First Amendment.191
B.

The Recent Cases

Two U.S. Courts of Appeals cases, Glik v. Cunniffe192 from the First
Circuit, and Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle193 from the Third Circuit, both shed
light on the problems restrictive state wiretapping laws create and the
ramifications they have on the rights encompassed by the First Amendment.
1.

Glik v. Cunniffe

The facts of Glik v. Cunniffe are rather simple. Police arrested Simon Glik
for using his cell phone’s digital video camera to film several police officers
arresting a young man in the Boston Common.194 He was charged with
violation of Massachusetts’ wiretapping statute.195 Glik was walking past the
184. Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
185. 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 (D.N.J. 2006).
186. Id. at 506–07.
187. Id. at 507.
188. Id. at 508.
189. Pomykacz, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
190. Id. at 513 n.14 (alteration in original).
191. Id. (noting language from the Third Circuit indicating that videotaping or recording
police may be a protected activity).
192. 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
193. 622 F.3d 248, 248 (3d. Cir. 2010).
194. Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
195. Id. The statute states:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section any person who willfully
commits an interception, attempts to commit an interception, or procures any other person
to commit an interception or to attempt to commit an interception of any wire or oral
communication shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned in the
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Boston Common, a state park, when he witnessed three police officers
arresting a young man.196 While witnessing the encounter, he heard a bystander
say something to the effect of, “[y]ou are hurting him, stop.”197 Concerned that
the officers were using excessive force, he stopped approximately ten feet
away from the incident and began recording video footage of the arrest on his
cell phone.198
After detaining the suspect, an officer turned to Glik and said, “I think you
have taken enough pictures.”199 He replied, “I am recording this. I saw you
punch him.”200 An officer then approached him and asked if his cell phone
recorded audio.201 When he affirmed that he was recording audio, the officer
placed him in handcuffs and arrested him for unlawful audio recording in
violation of the Massachusetts wiretapping statute.202 He was taken to the
South Boston Police Station and, in the course of booking, his cell phone and
computer flash drive were confiscated.203 The charges were eventually dropped
because he had used his cell phone openly and in plain view to obtain the video
and audio recording.204 He later filed a civil rights action against the officers
and the City of Boston for violations of his First Amendment rights.205 The
district court concluded that he had a First Amendment right to openly audio
record the police encounter he witnessed.206
On appeal, the First Circuit agreed.207 First, the court noted that the First
Amendment right to openly record a police encounter does not hinge on
whether the recorder is a private citizen or a member of the news media.208
Next, the court found it pertinent that Glik filmed the police officers in the
Boston Common, the oldest city park in the United States.209 The court went

state prison for not more than five years, or imprisoned in a jail or house of correction for
not more than two and one half years, or both so fined and given one such imprisonment.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2010).
196. Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 79–80.
199. Id. at 80.
200. Id.
201. Glik, 655 F.3d at 80.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. Massachusetts law only prohibits a secret interception of an oral communication.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 99(B)(4) & (C)(1) (2010).
205. Glik, 655 F.3d at 80. Glik also alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
However, those allegations are not addressed in this note.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 82.
208. Id. at 83–84 (holding that “the news-gathering protections of the First Amendment
cannot turn on professional credentials or status.”).
209. Id. at 84.
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on to state that “[i]n such traditional public spaces, the rights of the state to
limit the exercise of First Amendment activity are ‘sharply circumscribed.’”210
Furthermore, the Court found it pertinent that Glik’s recording did not interfere
with the police officers’ performance of their duties.211 Lastly, the court noted
that “police officers are expected to endure significant burdens caused by
citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights.”212
2.

Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle

In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, a truck was pulled over for speeding.213 A
passenger recorded the encounter with a handheld video camera located in his
lap.214 Eventually, the officer noticed that the passenger was filming him and
arrested the passenger for violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance Control Act.215 After the arrest, the passenger brought
a civil action against the arresting officer, alleging that his First Amendment
rights were violated when he was arrested for filming the officer during the
traffic stop.216 The district court held that it was unclear whether the passenger
had a right to videotape police performing their duties on public property.217
Kelly marked the first time the Third Circuit directly addressed the right to
videotape police officers.218 The Third Circuit had previously hypothesized
that “videotaping or photographing the police in the performance of their
duties on public property may be a protected activity.”219 Relying on caselaw
from other courts, the court conceded that this right does exist.220 But the court
framed the right narrowly, concluding that “videotaping without an expressive
purpose may not be protected . . . .”221 Unfortunately, the court did not

210. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983)).
211. Id.
212. Id. (citing City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (“[T]he First Amendment
protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers.”)).
213. 622 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2010).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 251–52. The Act provides that “a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if
he intentionally intercepts . . . any . . . oral communication . . . .” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703(1)
(2010). The statute defines “oral communication” as “[a]ny oral communication uttered by a
person possessing an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation.” Id. § 5702.
216. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 252.
217. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 2009 WL 1230309, at *8 (M.D.Pa. May 4, 2009), aff’d,
622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010).
218. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260.
219. Giles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
220. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260, 262. The court relied on cases within the Eleventh and Third
Circuits to determine whether the right to record police officers exists. Id. at 260.
221. Id.
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elaborate on when a recording would be for an expressive purpose. However, it
did cite a case for what constitutes an expressive purpose: Pomykacz v
Borough of West Wildwood.222 In Pomykacz, a district court implied that
videotaping for political activism reasons was a communicative or expressive
purpose.223 Another case has suggested that the selling of photography and
videography is an expressive purpose.224 Without indicating whether or not the
recording of a traffic stop was an expressive activity, the court held that “the
right to videotape police officers during traffic stops [is] not clearly
established”.225 The court based its holding on two main reasons.226 First, the
court noted that caselaw had yet to address recording of police in the context of
a traffic stop.227 Second, the court characterized traffic stops as “inherently
dangerous situations,”228 which demonstrated the court’s willingness to limit
citizens’ First Amendment rights when safety concerns arise.
The previous section addressed those courts which had recognized First
Amendment rights to openly record police conduct during a public protest,229
to openly film police conduct to unravel allegedly unsafe means of carrying
out official duties,230 and to photograph a police officer in connection with a
citizen’s political activism.231 After Glik and Kelly, an individual has a First
Amendment right to openly record police conduct in a public park,232 but does
not have an established First Amendment right to openly record officers in the
discharge of their duties during a traffic stop.233
What is the difference between a police-citizen encounter in the Boston
Common and a police-citizen encounter at a traffic stop? For one, the Supreme
Court has held that traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to police
officers.”234 In the eyes of the Supreme Court, the risk of harm to both the
police and vehicle occupants is minimized “if the officers routinely exercise
unquestioned command of the situation.”235 Second, a park, unlike a traffic

222. Id. at 261.
223. See Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 513 n.14 (D.N.J.
2006).
224. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695–96 (2d Cir. 1996).
225. Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262–63.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 262.
228. Id. at 262–63.
229. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438–39 (9th Cir. 1995).
230. Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
231. See Pomykacz, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 513 n.14 (D.N.J. 2006).
232. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011).
233. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262–63 (3d Cir. 2010).
234. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983).
235. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009). For this purpose, the Supreme Court has
held that during a traffic stop, the officer effectively seizes everyone in the vehicle including all
passengers. Id. at 327.
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stop, is a traditional “public space”236 where citizens are afforded heightened
First Amendment protections. However, both encounters do have some
similarities. To illustrate, the Glik court relied on the fact that Mr. Glik filmed
the encounter from a safe distance and neither spoke to nor disturbed the
officers in any way.237 The same is true in Kelly.238 The passenger, while he
may have been closer to the officers, merely held the video camera in his lap
without disturbing the officers.
As seen by the foregoing caselaw, courts agree that recording police
conduct and communications is, to some extent, a First Amendment right. The
next section will examine the extent and contours of the First Amendment right
to record.
IV. A SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE GUIDELINE FOR INTERPRETING THE SCOPE
AND LIMITATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECORD POLICE
COMMUNICATIONS
The Glik and Kelly courts both held that the right to record is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.239 This
language comes from the Supreme Court which has stated that the government
may impose reasonable restrictions on the “time, place, or manner” of
exercising First Amendment rights “provided the restrictions are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”240 The Glik
court stated, “[w]e have no occasion to explore those limitations . . . .”241 In
this section, I will explore some of those limitations by suggesting the
following guideline in determining the contours of the First Amendment right
to record police communications: the First Amendment protects an individual’s
right to audio record a uniformed, on duty police officer’s oral
communications unless the recording would substantially interfere with the
performance of the officer’s duties.
The “substantial interference” guideline has two main parts. First, the
officer must be on duty and uniformed. When I say uniformed, I am referring
to officers who are in uniform, i.e., it is clearly apparent from their clothing
that they are police officers acting in their official capacity at the time of the
recording. The guideline is limited to communications of on duty, uniformed
police officers because “[c]ommunications of this sort lack any reasonable

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.
Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262.
Glik, 655 F.3d at 84; Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal quotations omitted).
Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.
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expectation of privacy . . . .”242 Because conversations uttered in the open are
not protected from being overheard, an expectation of privacy cannot attach to
the conversation.243 Furthermore, when I say public communications, I mean
only those communications with members of the public. For instance, a right
of privacy would be given to a communication between two officers sitting
alone in a squad car talking between themselves because those are private, not
public, communications.
Second, the guideline provides that the recording must not substantially
interfere with the performance of the officer’s duties. I take the substantial
interference aspect of the guideline directly from Glik. Recall that in Glik, Mr.
Glik filmed the police-citizen encounter from approximately ten feet away.244
He never verbally or physically interacted with the citizen or the arresting
officers.245 The court specifically stated two things that provide support for a
guideline that hinges on a substantial interference standard. First, the court
noted that “[s]uch peaceful recording of an arrest in a public space that does
not interfere with the police officers’ performance of their duties is not
reasonably subject to limitation.”246 The indication here is that if the recording
were to interfere with the officers’ performance of their duties, the recording
would be subject to limitation. Second, the court went on to note that “police
officers are expected to endure significant burdens caused by citizens’ exercise
of their First Amendment rights.”247 Based on the above two statements by the
Glik court, a substantial interference standard properly balances the needs of
effective law enforcement while ensuring that the interference must cross a
high threshold before it is subject to limitation.
Additionally, the guideline I have proposed does not hinge on who the
recorder is. The recorder could be an individual talking directly to an officer,
an individual not talking directly to an officer, but one in very close proximity
such as the passenger in Kelly, or a bystander to the communication such as
Mr. Glik. Support for declining to make a distinction among recorders also
comes directly from Glik.248 Under the proposed guideline, the only pertinent
and relevant issue is whether or not the recording would substantially interfere
with the performance of the officer’s duties. On the plus side, the guideline
strikes a balance between the First Amendment right to record and the practical

242. ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 606 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)) (internal quotations omitted).
243. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
244. Glik, 655 F.3d at 80.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 84.
247. Id.
248. Id. (noting that the development in technology makes clear why the newsgathering
protections of the First Amendment are given to the public at large and not solely to those in the
news media).
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needs of law enforcement. This is primarily accomplished in three ways. First,
the officer must be uniformed. Second, the officer must be on duty. Third, the
interference must be substantial before the First Amendment right to record is
subject to limitation.
Furthermore, while at this juncture it is unclear under what circumstances a
recording would substantially interfere with the performance of an officer’s
duties, the Supreme Court has endorsed a case-by-case standard for substantial
interference in restricting First Amendment rights.249 In the context of the free
speech rights afforded to public school children, the Court has held that that
public schools may restrict the First Amendment speech rights of students only
when necessary to “avoid . . . substantial interference with schoolwork or
discipline.”250 A similar restraint-based approach is applicable to police
officers. Like public school officials, police officers are public servants251 and
are accordingly “expected to endure significant burdens caused by citizens’
exercise of their First Amendment rights.”252
For instance, does the recording done by the passenger in Kelly
substantially interfere?253 I think not. The passenger, who was the person
recording, was not even involved in the stop, and was not the one being
questioned by the officer.254 The recording may have interfered minimally, but
even so, as stated in Glik, the officer was expected to “endure significant
burdens caused by citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights.”255 In a
similar vein, it is clear that in Commonwealth v. Hyde, Mr. Hyde’s recording
did not substantially interfere with the officers’ performance of their duties, as
it was unknown to the officers that Hyde was recording.256 Under my
guideline, secret recordings would nearly always be permissible because they
are just that: secret. Officers would not be aware that a recording is occurring
and thus there would be no chance for interference, let alone substantial
interference. However, if officers were physically prevented from reaching the
scene of an accident or arresting an individual due to or due in large part to a
recording, that would likely constitute a substantial interference. Lastly, what if
Mr. Glik had recorded the encounter from five feet away instead of ten feet? It
seems logical to concede that the closer the recorder is to the police encounter,
the higher the chance of substantial interference with the officer’s duties.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
Id.
See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1034–35 (1991).
See Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id.
Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.
750 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Mass. 2001).
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However, it is equally conceivable that a substantial interference, under certain
circumstances, could occur from two feet away or from twenty feet away.
One commentator has suggested a federal statutory solution for remedying
defective state wiretapping laws.257 This commentator suggests a rebuttable
presumption that an on duty officer’s oral communications, if uttered in the
public sphere, are subject to recording.258 The presumption is rebutted only if
the recording would “create or significantly exacerbate a substantial risk of
imminent harm to the police officer, other persons, or national security.”259
My guideline differs in two basic ways. First, instead of a federal statutory
solution, the states are free to amend their own wiretapping laws. As noted in
Part I, the validity of both the Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Act and the
Illinois Eavesdropping Act has been called into doubt.260 An Illinois lawmaker
has already proposed changes to the Illinois Eavesdropping Act that would
allow individuals to audio record a police officer working in public without the
officer’s consent.261 While the proposed amendment does not strike the balance
my guideline seeks, it shows that state lawmakers are aware that restrictive
wiretapping laws need to be amended. Second, my guideline, instead of
hinging on safety, hinges on whether the recording would substantially
interfere with the performance of the officer’s duties. A substantial interference
standard is a better approach for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has
already endorsed this approach in restricting First Amendment rights, albeit in
other contexts.262 Second, the standard strikes a better balance between the
needs of law enforcement and the right to record under the First Amendment.
For instance, under the safety of the officer standard,263 it is predictable that a
court would rule that drivers and passengers could not record their
communications with police officers during a traffic stop since the Supreme
Court has held that traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to police
officers.”264 Under my proposed guideline, the recording would be permitted
unless it would substantially interfere with the officer’s performance of their
duties, allowing a greater exercise of individuals’ First Amendment rights.

257. Kies, supra note 42, at 307 (proposing amendment to federal law to balance the First
Amendment right to record police communications with police officers’ privacy interests).
258. Id. at 308.
259. Id.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 194–212, 130–40.
261. H.B. 3944, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011).
262. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
263. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
264. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1047 (1983)).
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CONCLUSION
As evidenced by Ms. Moore’s arrest and subsequent prosecution, violation
of state wiretapping laws can have grave consequences.265 However, courts, for
the most part, are in agreement that the recording of police conduct and
communications, to some extent, is a First Amendment newsgathering right.266
The standard that I have proposed, one that hinges on a substantial interference
in the performance of the officer’s duties, accomplishes two goals. First, it
offers a guideline for determining the scope and contours of the First
Amendment right to record police communications. Second, it provides states
like Illinois and Massachusetts a guideline for revamping their constitutionally
defective wiretapping laws.
The ACLU’s proposed program for monitoring police conduct267 fits
squarely within the parameters of my proposed guideline. As stated by the
ACLU, the recordings would be limited to on duty officers while in public and
would not interfere with the performance of the officer’s duties.268 In a time
when nearly every American owns a cell phone capable of recording audio, the
protections of the First Amendment demand change to restrictive state
wiretapping statutes.
JUSTIN WELPLY*

265. See supra text accompanying notes 10–17.
266. See supra Part III.A–B.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 129–35.
268. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 113, at 9.
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